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Abstract
Due to developments on the oil market in the 1970s, the theory of exhaustible resources was
extended with the cartel-versus-fringe model to characterize markets with one big coherent cartel
and a large number of small suppliers called the fringe. Because cartel and fringe are leader and
follower, the von Stackelberg solution concept is appropriate for the supply side of this market.
The solution for the cartel-versus-fringe model, presented in the previous literature, proved to be
time-inconsistent for a large plausible range of values for extraction costs and initial reserves.
This paper provides a (strongly) time-consistent solution for the cartel-versus-fringe model.
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1. Introduction
The oil price shocks in the 1970s increased the interest for the theory of the supply
of raw materials from natural exhaustible resources which dates back to the seminal
work of Hotelling (1931). Salant (1976) suggested to characterize the supply side of
the oil market by one big coherent cartel and a large number of small suppliers, called
the fringe. This market structure was analyzed in a number of papers, e.g. Pindyck
(1978), Salant (1982), Lewis and Schmalensee (1980a, 1980b), and Ulph and Folie
(1980). All these studies use the Nash equilibrium concept. Gilbert (1978) put forward
that, for this market structure, the von Stackelberg solution concept might be more
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appropriate. The cartel is the leader and determines the extraction path  rst, whereas
the suppliers in the fringe are followers and just react to that. However, the von
Stackelberg solution that was derived for this model had an undesirable property. For
plausible values of the extraction costs and initial reserves, the strategy of the cartel
proved to be time-inconsistent: the ex ante optimal extraction path ceases to be optimal
ex post in case the strategy is reconsidered at a future point in time. This means that,
in the absence of commitments, the cartel has an incentive to renege on the announced
extraction path (Ulph and Folie, 1981; Newbery, 1981; Ulph, 1982; Groot et al., 1992).
This problem attracted quite some attention (Karp and Newbery, 1991, 1992, 1993)
but up to now the literature on exhaustible resources does not provide a time-consistent
von Stackelberg solution for the cartel-versus-fringe model.
It is important to note that in the models employed so far it is assumed that the
suppliers choose extraction paths as functions of the initial stocks of the resource and
time. In the theory of di erential games the resulting solution is called the open-loop
solution. In order to check time-consistency, strategies are reconsidered at some point
in time, so that it is implicitly assumed that the extraction paths are functions of the
resource stocks at that point in time. This is somewhat confusing but might be clari ed
by using a more precise notion of time-consistency introduced by Ba  sar (1989).A n
open-loop solution is called weakly time-consistent if the solution does not change
when reconsidered at any point in time, starting from resource stocks that result from
applying the solution up to that point in time. The conclusion of the previous literature
on the cartel-versus-fringe model is that the open-loop von Stackelberg solution is
weakly time-consistent for some values of the extraction costs and initial reserves but
time-inconsistent for the other values. Time-inconsistency is a property of the solution
and can only be solved by putting constraints on the solution (see e.g. Fischer, 1980)o r
by using another solution concept. The most common approach is to derive the solution
with dynamic programming, because then time-consistency is achieved by construction,
but this implies that extractions are assumed to be functions of the current resource
stocks. The information structure is changed and in the terminology of di erential
games the feedback von Stackelberg solution results. The combination of requiring
time-consistency and conditioning on the current state is also referred to as Markov
perfectness. Note that in this case time-consistency holds not only when starting from
resource stocks on the solution trajectory but also when starting from resource stocks o 
the solution trajectory. Therefore Ba  sar (1989) refers to strong time-consistency. Note
also that as a consequence feedback solutions are robust against unexpected shocks to
the resource stocks such as unexpected new oil discoveries: the solutions in terms of
functions are the same but the resulting extractions change with the changes in the
stocks, of course.
In this paper the feedback von Stackelberg solution is derived for the cartel-versus-
fringe model. This means that the set of Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equations for dy-
namic programming has to be solved sequentially, starting with the fringe (see e.g.
Ba  sar and Olsder, 1982; Dockner et al., 2000). It can be shown that for a large
number of small identical fringe members, the reaction of the total fringe can be mod-
elled as one producer who supplies the rest of the market in case the resulting price
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similar to the one in the open-loop von Stackelberg solution. The hard part, however,
is to solve the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation for the cartel, given the reac-
tion of the fringe. In a linear-quadratic framework, the usual procedure is to postulate
a quadratic value function, but in this case one has no clue what the value function
will look like. Therefore, we start from a class of plausible extraction schedules and
check the optimality conditions and the dynamics of the HJB equation. In this way the
optimal extraction schedule is found and also the value function (which proves to be
very complicated, as is to be expected).
More speci cally, it is  rst shown that for values of the extraction costs and initial
reserves, for which the open-loop von Stackelberg solution is weakly time-consistent,
the solution is also strongly time-consistent. The main contribution of the paper, how-
ever, is to present strongly time-consistent extraction schedules for values of the ex-
traction costs and initial reserves, for which the open-loop von Stackelberg solution is
time-inconsistent. It will be interesting to note that a conjecture by Karp and New-
bery (1993), that the open-loop Nash equilibrium may be an answer in certain cases,
is con rmed. It will also be interesting to note that the strongly time-consistent ex-
traction schedules for the cartel-versus-fringe model are not more complicated but, on
the contrary, more transparent and more intuitive than the open-loop von Stackelberg
extraction schedules.
Section 2 presents the cartel-versus-fringe model with linear demand and constant
marginal extraction costs as was introduced by Ulph and Folie (1981) and Newbery
(1981). 1 In Section 3 the approach is described and Section 4 presents the strongly
time-consistent solution. Section 5 is a short conclusion.
2. The cartel-versus-fringe model
The supply side of some markets for exhaustible natural resources, such as the oil
market, can be characterized by one big coherent cartel and a large number of small
suppliers called the fringe. The cartel has initial resource stock Sc
0 and extracts Ec(t)
at time t with constant marginal extraction costs kc. Similarly, each fringe member
has the same initial resource stock Sf
0i and extracts Ef
i (t) at time t with constant and
equal marginal extraction costs kf;i =1;:::;N, where N denotes the number of fringe
members. The demand function is assumed to be linear. A so-called “choke” price   p
indicates that above this price the demand for the resource will be zero (for example
because a backstop technology becomes available). It follows that in market equilibrium
the price is a linear function of total supply:





The marginal extraction costs kc and kf are assumed to be smaller than the choke
price   p in order to make sure that both the cartel and the fringe want to exploit the
resource.
1 Karp and Tahvonen (1995) solve the time-consistency issue but change the model. They consider the
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The objectives of the cartel and each fringe member i are to maximize discounted
pro ts, given by
  ∞
0
e−rt[  p − Ec(t) − Ef(t) − kc]Ec(t)dt; (2)
  ∞
0
e−rt[  p − Ec(t) − Ef(t) − kf]Ef
i (t)dt; i =1 ;:::;N; (3)
respectively, where r is the constant discount rate, subject to the dynamics of the
extraction of the resource stocks, given by





i (0) = Sf
0i;i =1 ;:::;N; (5)
where the extraction rates and the stocks (Sc and Sf
i ) have to be non-negative at each
point in time.
The cartel is a von Stackelberg leader and moves  rst but in choosing the supply,
the cartel has to take the reaction of the fringe into account. When this problem is
solved by sequentially applying Pontryagin’s maximum principle ( rst to the problem
of the fringe in order to get the optimal reaction and then to the problem of the cartel),
the open-loop von Stackelberg solution results. A summary can be found in Section
3. However, this solution has the undesirable property that the optimal extraction path
of the cartel is time-inconsistent for plausible values of the extraction costs and initial
reserves (Ulph and Folie, 1981; Newbery, 1981; Ulph, 1982; Groot et al., 1992).
Therefore, the next sections consider the feedback von Stackelberg solution.
3. The approach
By construction, time-inconsistency is removed if one requires that the extractions
are optimal at each point in time for each value of the resource stocks at that point
in time. Ba  sar (1989) calls this strong time-consistency in order to distinguish it from
weak time-consistency, that holds only on the solution path. To put it di erently, the
feedback (or Markov perfect) von Stackelberg solution has to be derived. As in all
dynamic programming problems, the solution is characterized by a set of HJB equations
(see e.g. Ba  sar and Olsder, 1982; Dockner et al., 2000).
The leader–follower structure implies that at each point in time for each value of the
resource stocks, the cartel determines the extraction  rst. The fringe members act simul-
taneously given the extraction of the cartel. The solution is found by  rst determining
the reaction of the fringe members to the action of the cartel. The cartel-versus-fringe
model assumes a large number of small fringe members where each individual fringe
member has an insigni cant in uence on the game that is played (see e.g. Jovanovic
and Rosenthal, 1988). This can be modelled by starting from N individual fringe mem-
bers and letting N go to in nity. It will be shown that a reaction of the aggregate fringe
results that has to be taken into account in the optimization problem for the cartel. This
reaction is similar to what was found in the open-loop von Stackelberg solution.F. Groot et al./Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28 (2003) 287–306 291
First, consider the HJB equations for the fringe, given by (omitting the time argument






















 =0 ;i =1 ;:::;N; (6)
where V f
i denote the value functions and where the price p is given by (1).
The maximization yields Ef
i = 0 or the  rst-order conditions





i =0 ;i =1 ;:::;N: (7)






















¿0;i =1 ;:::;N: (9)
It follows that in the limit for N →∞
Ef ↓
 






i ↓ 0;i =1 ;:::;N: (10)
With value functions of the form V f
i =  fSf
i ;i =1 ;:::;N, it is easy to see that in
the limit for N →∞, the HJB equations (6) are satis ed and that
Ef = max{0;   p − Ec − kf − ert f}: (11)
This result can be interpreted as follows. From Hotelling (1931) we know that in a
competitive equilibrium, where all suppliers are price-takers with marginal extraction
costs kf, a price results of the type
p(t)=Pf(t): =kf +e rt f: (12)
This is referred to as the Hotelling rule or the competitive price path. The reaction of
the aggregate fringe, given by Eq. (11), can therefore be characterized as price-taking,
where the fringe supplies only at that competitive price and supplies the market in as
far the cartel is not supplying it. Note, however, that  f is a parameter that still has
to be determined. In most previous studies it was assumed from the outset that the
fringe as a whole can be treated as a price-taker but here it follows naturally from
the HJB equations (see for a similar idea Lewis and Schmalensee (1980a) and Groot
et al. (1990), for the open-loop case). Since the fringe can be treated as an aggregate,
one of the constraints, Eq. (5), can be replaced by
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The normal procedure would be to postulate a (parametrized) functional form for
the value function and then to solve (14), but in this case one has no clue what the
value function will look like. Therefore, another route is followed that will eventually
yield the value function.
Following the usual outcomes of these type of models, we will consider extrac-
tion schedules with combinations of four possible regimes, denoted by F;C;S and Cm.
In the  rst three regimes the competitive price, given by Eq. (12), results. In F the
fringe produces alone, in C the cartel produces alone, and in S cartel and fringe pro-
duce simultaneously. In the last regime Cm, the cartel produces alone as a monopolist.
Note that in this regime the resulting price (called the monopoly price) cannot be
above the competitive price, because otherwise the cartel cannot keep the fringe from
producing.
A closer look at the maximization in the HJB equation (14), subject to the price
equation (1) and the reaction of the fringe given by (11), reveals the following.
If Ec ¿   p − kf − ert f, the fringe does not produce and the objective in the HJB
equation is concave with the maximum at Ec= 1
2(  p−kc−ert @V










and this will be called the monopoly price, that will be denoted henceforth by Pm.
If Ec 6   p − kf − ert f, it follows from Eq. (11) that cartel and fringe supply the
market at the competitive price, given by (12), and the objective in the HJB equation
becomes linear with slope kf +e rt f − kc − ert @V
@Sc +e rt @V
@Sf .
In order to get the regime C, it must be optimal for the cartel to produce alone
at the competitive price, which implies that the slope of the linear part of the HJB
equation must be positive and the maximum location of the concave part cannot be to
the right of   p − kf − ert f.
In order to get the regime Cm, it must be optimal for the cartel to produce alone
at the monopoly price, which is guaranteed if the slope of the linear part of the HJB
equation is non-negative and if the maximum location of the concave part is to the
right of   p − kf − ert f.
In order to get the regime F, it must be optimal for the cartel to have the fringe
produce alone at the competitive price, which is guaranteed if the slope of the linear
part of the HJB equation is negative and if the maximum location of the concave part
is not to the right of   p − kf − ert f.
Finally, in order to get the regime S, it must be optimal for the cartel to have
simultaneous production at the competitive price, which implies that the slope of the
linear part of the HJB equation must be zero and the maximum location of the concave
part again cannot be to the right of   p − kf − ert f.
The idea is to start from plausible extraction schedules and to verify that these
optimality conditions are satis ed and that the resulting HJB di erential equation
holds. In the next section the feedback von Stackelberg solution is derived in this
way.F. Groot et al./Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28 (2003) 287–306 293
Fig. 1.
Fig. 2.
4. The feedback von Stackelberg solution
In characterizing the solutions of the cartel-versus-fringe model it is convenient to  x
kc, the marginal extraction cost of the cartel, and to vary kf, the marginal extraction cost
of the fringe. First we recollect the open-loop von Stackelberg solution. In the  gures
above and below, which are derived in detail by Groot et al. (1990), Pf denotes the
competitive price, Pm denotes the monopoly price, and MC denotes the full marginal
cost of the cartel when producing at the competitive price. The full marginal cost
consists of the marginal extraction cost (kc) plus the shadow price of one unit of its
own stock plus the shadow price of leaving one unit in the stock of the fringe (denoted
later by  c).
If kf ¿ 1
2(  p + kc) and the initial resource stock of the cartel is small relative to
the initial resource stock of the fringe, the result is the extraction schedule C →F in
Fig. 1. If, on the other hand, the initial resource stock of the cartel is relatively large,
the result is the extraction schedule Cm →C →F in Fig. 2. Both outcomes are weakly
time-consistent.294 F. Groot et al./Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28 (2003) 287–306
Fig. 3.
If kc ¡kf 6 1
2(  p+kc) and the initial resource stock of the cartel is relatively small,
Fig. 1 with C → F applies again, but if the initial resource stock of the cartel is
relatively large, time-inconsistent extraction schedules result.
If kf = kc, in nitely many solutions occur. One is the open-loop Nash equilibrium,
given by the extraction schedule S → Cm in Fig. 3, which is weakly time-consistent.
Finally if kf ¡kc, time-inconsistent extraction schedules result.
The main part of the paper is to show that the weakly time-consistent extraction
schedules C → F, Cm → C → F and S → Cm are also strongly time-consistent, using
the approach presented in Section 3. It will be shown that these extraction schedules
satisfy the HJB equations for a wider range of parameter values than for which they
are the open-loop von Stackelberg solution. More precisely, the extraction schedule
Cm → C → F is strongly time-consistent, for the parameter values for which it also
is the open-loop von Stackelberg solution but the extraction schedules C → F and
S → Cm satisfy the HJB equations for a wider range of parameter values. These
ranges are even overlapping, so that in  rst instance these schedules can be seen as
candidate feedback von Stackelberg solutions. Later the overlapping parameter space
will be divided in an area where C → F is the solution and one where S → Cm is,
simply using the criterium of largest pro ts for the cartel, since the cartel is the leader
in this game. The extraction schedule F → S → Cm is also a candidate feedback von
Stackelberg solution but a proof will be omitted, because it is similar to the other
proofs. When the  nal result is presented, it will be shown for which parameter values
the last extraction schedule is the solution.
First, consider the extraction schedule C → F. In Proposition 1 it is shown that this
is a candidate solution for kf ¿kc up to a certain level of kf. This borderline marks
the point where the solution becomes the extraction schedule Cm → C → F, as will
be seen later. Proposition 1 assumes given initial reserves and then yields an upper
level for kf. One can also  x kf ¿ 1
2(  p + kc) and state that for relatively large initial
reserves for the fringe, the solution is C → F and for relatively small initial reserves
for the fringe, the solution is Cm → C → F. The borderline is in fact the same as













most clearly presented in a graph where kc and Sc
0 are  xed and kf is varied on one
axis and Sf
0 on the other axis: see Fig. 4.
Proposition 1. A ˆ k with 1
2(  p + kc)¡ ˆ k¡  p exists such that the following holds. If
kc ¡kf ¡ ˆ k, the extraction schedule C → F in Fig. 1( where the cartel produces
 rst at the competitive price, followed by the fringe) is a candidate feedback von
Stackelberg solution.
Proof. We have to show that at each time t between 0 and t1 (i.e. in the C-regime),
for each set of resource stocks Sc and Sf, it is optimal for the cartel to fully supply
the market at the competitive price. In Section 3 we derived the optimality conditions
for the C-regime








  p + kc +e rt @V
@Sc
 
¿kf +e rt f (17)





kf +e rt f − kc − ert @V
@Sc
 
(  p − kf − ert f)=0 : (18)
Condition (17) implies that the cartel cannot act as a monopolist, because the result-
ing price would be above the competitive price and the fringe would start producing.
Condition (16) implies that it is better for the cartel to fully supply the market at the
competitive price instead of letting the fringe produce or producing simultaneously (the
slope of the linear part in the objective is positive: see Section 3). Finally, condition
(18) yields strong time-consistency.
Appendix A provides the rest of the formal proof but a sketch of that proof is as
follows. Because the competitive price Pf given by Eq. (12) equals the choke price296 F. Groot et al./Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28 (2003) 287–306
  p at t2, the variable  f is a function of t2 (and the parameters   p, kf and r). Since
we start from a given extraction schedule, the pro ts-to-go (the value function) of the
cartel at time t can be expressed in t; t1 and t2 (and the parameters   p; kf;k c and r).
Furthermore, t1 and t2 are implicitly given as functions of t; Sc(t) and Sf(t), using the
conditions that both the cartel and the fringe exhaust their resource stocks. It follows
that the value function is implicitly given and that the partial derivatives with respect
to t; Sc and Sf can be determined. Tedious but straightforward calculations then show
that condition (16) is satis ed for kf ¿kc, condition (17) is satis ed for kf ¡ ˆ k for
some ˆ k with 1
2(  p + kc)¡ ˆ k¡  p. Condition (18) is satis ed everywhere.
In the range 1
2(  p + kc)6kf, Proposition 1 states that for small kf the extrac-
tion schedule C →F is a candidate solution but for large kf it is not. As was al-
ready mentioned above, Proposition 1 determines a dividing curve in this range in the
kf − Sf
0 plane (see Fig. 4), below which the extraction schedule C →F is both the
open-loop and the feedback von Stackelberg solution: C →F is weakly time-consistent
but also strongly time-consistent in this area. Above this dividing curve, the extrac-
tion schedule Cm →C →F is the open-loop von Stackelberg solution, which is weakly
time-consistent. The next step is to prove that this extraction schedule is also strongly
time-consistent. First we have to show that it holds for the last two stages C →F,
but this is immediately clear because when entering these last two stages, the stock
of the cartel has decreased and we are back in that area of the kf − Sf
0 plane where
C →F is shown to be the strongly time-consistent solution. 2 Thus the proof of the
next proposition only has to deal with the  rst stage Cm.
Proposition 2. The weakly time-consistent open-loop von Stackelberg solution Cm→C
→F in Fig. 2( where the cartel produces  rst at the monopoly price and then at the
competitive price, followed by the fringe) is strongly time-consistent.
Proof. We have to show that at each time t between 0 and t1, for each set of resource
stocks Sc and Sf, it is optimal for the cartel to fully supply the market at the monopoly
price. In Section 3 we derived the optimality conditions








  p + kc +e rt @V
@Sc
 
¡kf +e rt f (20)
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Condition (20) implies that the cartel can act as a monopolist and condition (19)
assures that it cannot be better for the cartel to let the fringe produce alone at the
competitive price (the slope of the linear part in the objective is non-negative: see
Section 3). As before, condition (21) yields strong time-consistency.
The rest of the proof is similar in structure to the proof of Proposition 1 and only
a sketch of the proof is given here. 3 Consider Fig. 2. The curve Pf intersects   p at
t3, the curve MC at t2 and the curve Pm at t1, so that the parameters of these curves
are functions of t1;t 2 and t3 (and the parameters   p; kf;k c and r). Since we start
from a given extraction schedule, the pro ts-to-go (the value function) of the cartel
at time t can be expressed in t; t1;t 2 and t3 (and the parameters   p; kf;k c and r).
Exhaustion of the two resource stocks plus one of the conditions for the open-loop von
Stackelberg solution (see Groot et al., 1990) yield t1, t2 and t3 as implicit functions
of t;Sc(t) and Sf(t). It follows that the value function of the cartel is implicitly given
and that the partial derivatives with respect to t;Sc and Sf can be determined. The last
two partial derivatives prove to be equal to the parameters ( c and  c) of the curves
Pm and MC. Conditions (20) and (19) then read that the curve Pf should be above
the curve Pm and should not be below the curve MC. This can easily be checked from
the positions of the three curves in the stage Cm. Finally, straightforward calculations
show that Condition (21) is also satis ed.
We now move to the lower part of Fig. 4. As was recollected above, the extraction
schedule S →Cm is one of the open-loop von Stackelberg solutions in the case kf =
kc but it is also the open-loop Nash equilibrium. Karp and Newbery (1993) already
conjectured that the open-loop Nash equilibrium may be the strongly time-consistent
solution for certain parameter values. The next proposition indeed shows that S →Cm
is a candidate solution for a wide range of parameter values.
Proposition 3. If 1
2(  p + kc)¿kf and the initial resource stock of the cartel is large
relative to the initial resource stock of the fringe, the extraction schedule S →Cm in
Fig. 3( where the cartel and the fringe produce  rst simultaneously at the competitive
price, followed by the cartel as a monopolist) is a candidate feedback von Stackelberg
solution.
Proof. We have to show that at each time t between 0 and t1 (i.e., in the S-regime), for
each set of resource stocks Sc and Sf, it is optimal for the cartel to have simultaneous
production at the competitive price. In Section 3 we derived the optimality conditions








  p + kc +e rt @V
@Sc
 
¿kf +e rt f: (23)
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Using Eq. (22) we get the HJB equation
@V
@t
− (  p − kf − ert f)
@V
@Sf =0 : (24)
Condition (22) states that the cartel is indi erent whether to produce alone or to
let the fringe produce alone or to produce simultaneously at the competitive price (the
slope of the linear part in the objective is zero: see Section 3).
The rest of the proof is much more di cult than for Propositions 1 and 2. Appendix
B provides a full proof but the main steps are summarized in what follows. “Ex post”
the extraction schedule S →Cm in Fig. 3 can be characterized by variables  f and  c
of the competitive and monopoly price paths, respectively, so that we can write the
extractions as functions of time s,  f and  c. The idea is to perform a transformation
of these coordinates which  nally leads to a partial di erential equation in the value




;  f = 1
2 e−rt  
(  p + kc − 2kf)x +(  p − kc)y
 
;
 c =e −rt(  p − kc)y:
Note that t denotes the point in time at which we want to verify the HJB equation
and s denotes the running time. This transformation may look a bit strange at  rst
sight but the reverse transformation
x =e r(t−t1);y =e r(t−t2);z =e r(t−s)












(  p + kc − 2kf)(x − 1 − lnx)+(  p − kc)(y − 1 − lny)=2 r(Sf + Sc):
These restrictions de ne x and y as implicit functions of Sc and Sf, from which the
partial derivatives of x and y with respect to Sc and Sf can be derived. The pro ts-to-go
of the cartel can be written as a function of t; x and y. It is now possible, but rather
complex, to derive a linear partial di erential equation in the pro ts-to-go or the value
function of the cartel (see Appendix B). In this derivation optimality condition (22)
is used as well as the property that Ef as a function of x;y and z is homogeneous of
degree zero. This partial di erential equation can be solved and we get an expression
for the value function of the cartel. It is now straightforward, although again rather
tedious, to derive the optimal extraction schedule of the cartel in the simultaneous
phase. The optimality condition (22) and the HJB equation (24) are always satis ed.
The optimality condition (23) is satis ed for 1
2(  p + kc)¿kf. Finally, the extraction
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in the range 1
2(  p + kc)¿kf ¿kc, the extraction schedule S →Cm is only a solution,
if the initial resource stock of the cartel is relatively large. In the range kf ¡kc,w e
do not have an analytical proof, but numerical calculations show that it is better for
the cartel to let the fringe produce alone for a while before producing simultaneously,
if the initial resource stock of the cartel is relatively small. It follows that in that case,
S →Cm is not the solution but the extraction schedule F →S →Cm, provided of course
that F →S →Cm also satis es the HJB equation. This is indeed the case. The proof
is similar to the earlier proofs and will be omitted here.
We are now ready to put the pieces together and provide a strongly time-consistent
solution for the cartel-versus-fringe model.
Proposition 4. If 1
2(  p + kc)6kf, the feedback von Stackelberg solution is either
represented by the extraction schedule C →F or by Cm →C →F. The last schedule
occurs if kf is relatively high or, to put it di erently, if the initial resource stock
of the fringe Sf
0 is relatively small. Fixing all the other parameters, a dividing curve
can be drawn in the kf–Sf
0 plane above which Cm →C →F is the solution and below
which C →F is the solution.
If kc ¡kf ¡ 1
2(  p + kc), a dividing curve in the kf − Sf
0 plane exists above which
the extraction schedule C →F represents the feedback von Stackelberg solution and
below which S →Cm is the solution.
If kf = kc, the extraction schedule S →Cm is the solution.
If kf ¡kc, the feedback von Stackelberg solution is either represented by the ex-
traction schedule S →Cm or by F →S →Cm. The last schedule occurs if kf is rel-
atively low or, to put it di erently, if the initial resource stock of the fringe Sf
0 is
relatively high. Fixing all the other parameters, a dividing curve can be drawn in the
kf − Sf
0 plane above which S →Cm is the solution and below which F →S →Cm is
the solution.
Proof. These results follow directly from Propositions 1–3, except for the result in the
range kc ¡kf ¡ 1
2(  p + kc). In Propositions 1 and 3 it was found that in this range
the extraction schedule C →F is a candidate solution but also the extraction schedule
S →Cm (that is below a dividing curve in the kf–Sf
0 plane where it exists). Which one
will occur simply depends on which one gives the highest pro ts to the cartel, since
the cartel is the leader in the game. This yields another dividing curve in the kf–Sf
0
plane above which C →F is the solution and below which S →Cm is the solution.
Fig. 4 gives an example of Proposition 4 where the initial resource stock of the
cartel Sc
0 is  xed at 200, the marginal extraction cost of the cartel kc at 50, the choke
price   p at 100 and the interest rate r at 10%. The dashed curve denotes the di-
viding curve below which the extraction schedule S →Cm as a candidate solution
exists.
It can be argued that the story is not complete because we have not checked whether
other candidate solutions may exist that yield higher pro ts for the cartel. However,300 F. Groot et al./Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28 (2003) 287–306
the following arguments complete the story. We make a distinction between two cases:
kf ¡kc and kf ¿kc.
If kf ¡kc, it cannot be a solution to have C in the  nal stage: at the moment of
exhaustion of the fringe, the cartel will start exploiting its monopoly power. It cannot
be a solution either to have S at the end. The formal proof is given in Appendix B,
in which we show that the sequence S →Cm is a solution where Cm occurs on a
non-degenerate interval of time. Let us now consider F as a  nal stage. A stage Cm
cannot precede this phase because the price trajectories Pf and Pm can intersect only
once. Also S is not eligible as a predecessor of F. It is better for the cartel to have an
interval with simultaneous supply split into two subintervals: a  rst interval in which
the fringe supplies alone and a second one in which the cartel supplies alone. The
same type of argument applies to show that F cannot be preceded by C. It follows
that in the case at hand the  nal stage must be a monopoly stage. It can be shown
that F →Cm does not satisfy the HJB equation. The candidate solutions are therefore
S →Cm, F →S →Cm, and C →S →Cm. The latter can be excluded using a continuity
argument with regard to the value function. 4
If kf ¿kc, then clearly also no C-stage can occur at the end. A regime S at the end
is excluded because it is better for the cartel to supply  rst at the competitive price. In
the case at hand this is a strongly time-consistent extraction schedule. Let us consider
F as a  nal stage. The sequence Cm →F can be excluded based on the fact that
C →F is strongly time-consistent. Clearly the sequence S →F cannot be optimal as a
 nal sequence. We conclude that the only regime preceding F can be the one where
the cartel produces alone at the competitive price. It is clear from the arguments used
above that we cannot have S or F preceding C →F. Hence, a monopoly phase is the
only candidate for preceding C →F. We now consider Cm as the  nal stage. Obviously
Cm can not be preceded by C. Moreover, it cannot be preceded by F. Such a sequence
violates the HJB conditions. Hence the only possibility before the monopoly phase is
simultaneous supply: S →Cm: Another candidate solution is therefore C →S →Cm.A s
before, this one can be excluded using a continuity argument with regard to the value
function.
Proposition 4 and Fig. 4 present the strongly time-consistent solution for the cartel-
versus-fringe model. As compared to the solutions presented in the previous literature,
it does not su er from time-inconsistency but it is also more transparent and intuitive.
While the solutions presented in the previous literature are often complicated sequences
of extraction schedules, here two simple mechanisms are at work. If the marginal
extraction costs of the fringe kf are relatively high, the cartel wants the fringe to
produce last. Furthermore, if the initial reserve of the cartel is relatively high, it can
start to produce as a monopolist. On the other hand, if the marginal extraction costs
of the fringe kf are relatively low, the cartel wants to produce last (as a monopolist)
and simultaneously with the fringe before that. Furthermore, if the initial reserve of the
fringe is relatively high, the cartel lets the fringe start producing. Time-inconsistency
is resolved but the intuition for the solution is simpler as well.
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5. Conclusion
This paper provides a strongly time-consistent solution for the cartel-versus-fringe
model for the supply side of markets for exhaustible natural resources. For a long
time it has been an open problem to solve time-inconsistency, which occurred for
the solution concept used in the previous literature, but the result is actually more
transparent and more intuitive than the previous results. The last two stages of the
extraction schedules are either C →F, in case the marginal extraction costs of
the fringe are relatively high, or S →Cm, in case the marginal extraction costs of
the cartel are relatively high. The stages C →F can be preceded by a stage Cm,i n
case the initial resource stock of the cartel is relatively high, and the stages S →Cm can
be preceded by a stage F, in case the initial resource stock of the fringe is relatively
high.
In our view, this completes the theory of the cartel-versus-fringe model with constant
marginal extraction costs, linear demand and  xed initial resource stocks. It may be
interesting for further research to consider models with marginal extraction costs that
depend on the stocks, with other demand schedules, or with stocks that change due to
exploration activities, induced by higher prices.
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Appendix A.
Consider Fig. 1, with extraction schedule C →F. The corresponding extraction rates
are given as follows. There exist a positive constant  f and points in time t1 and t2
with t2 ¿t 1 ¿0 such that
Ec(s)=   p − kf − ers f
Ef(s)=0 ( 06s¡t 1);
(A.1)
Ec(s)=0
Ef(s)=   p − kf − ers f (t1 6s6t2):
(A.2)
Fix some t with 06t¡t 1.A tt2 the price must reach the choke price   p, so that
kf +  fert2 =  p: (A.3)
We also have
  t2
t Ef(s)ds = Sf(t). Hence, using (A.3),
(  p − kf)[ert1−rt2 − 1+rt2 − rt1]=rSf(t): (A.4)302 F. Groot et al./Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28 (2003) 287–306
Similarly,
  t2
t Ec(s)ds = Sc(t). Hence, using (A.3),
(  p − kf)[ert−rt2 − ert1−rt2 + rt1 − rt]=rSc(t): (A.5)








(  p − kf)[(kf − kc)(1 − ert−rt1)+(  p + kc − 2kf)ert−rt2(rt1 − rt)
−(  p − kf)(ert1−rt2 − ert−rt2)ert−rt2]: (A.6)
Using the implicit function theorem we can  nd t1 and t2 as functions of t; Sc and
Sf from (A.4) and (A.5), where Sc and Sf denote the stocks at time t. The value
function of the cartel is then implicitly de ned by
V(t;Sc;Sf)= (t;t1(t;Sc;Sf);t 2(t;Sc;Sf)):










































(  p − kf)(ert1−rt2 − ert−rt2) − (kf − kc)(1 − ert−rt1) − (  p + kc − 2kf)(rt1 − rt)
(ert2 − ert)
:
We can now verify Eqs. (16)–(18). It is easy to check that Eq. (18) is satis ed. Eq.
(16) reduces to (kf − kc)(1 − ert−rt1)¿0 which is satis ed for kf ¿kc. Eq. (17) can
be seen as a linear expression in kf which has to be positive. It can be shown that
this expression is decreasing, positive for kf = 1
2(  p + kc) and negative for kf =  p.I t
follows that Eq. (17) is satis ed for kf ¡ ˆ k with 1
2(  p + kc)¡ ˆ k¡  p.
Appendix B.
Consider Fig. 3, with extraction schedule S →Cm. There exist positive constants  f
and  c and points in time t1 and t2 with t2 ¿t 1 ¿0 such that
Ec(s)+Ef(s)=   p − kf − ers f (06s¡t 1); (B.1)F. Groot et al./Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28 (2003) 287–306 303
Ec(s)=1
2(  p − kc) − 1
2ers c
Ef(s)=0 ( t1 6s6t2):
(B.2)
Fix some t with 06t¡t 1.A tt2 the price must reach the choke price   p, so that
1
2(  p + kc)+1
2ert2 c = p: (B.3)
The price path is continuous at t1, so that
kf +e rt1 f = 1
2(  p + kc)+1
2ert1 c: (B.4)
Given  f and  c it can easily be calculated how much the cartel and the fringe will
supply in total over the interval [0;t 1). Central in our approach is the claim that, given
 f and  c, there is also only one possible division of supply along this  rst interval if
kf  = kc. This follows from the fact that the cartel will simply choose the best one for
itself if there exist multiple candidates. Note that at any point in time between 0 and
t1 it is optimal to have the same  ’s. We write
Ec(s; f;  c)= ˆ Ec(ers f;ers c)( 0 6s¡t 1); (B.5)
Ef(s; f;  c)=   p − kf − ers f − Ec(s; f;  c)= ˆ Ef(ers f;ers c)( 0 6s¡t 1):
(B.6)
In view of the transformation to x;y and z we have








=:   Ef(x;y;z):
The restrictions with respect to the stocks are
  t1
t
ˆ Ef(ers f;ers c)ds = Sf(t);
  t2
t
[ ˆ Ec(ers f;ers c)+ ˆ Ef(ers f;ers c)]ds = Sc(t)+Sf(t);






  Ef(x;y;z)dz = rSf; (B.7)
a(x − 1 − lnx)+b(y − 1 − lny)=2 r(Sc + Sf); (B.8)
where a=  p+kc −2kf and b=  p−kc. The pro ts of the cartel, from time t onwards














[  p − kc +e rs c]
1
2




[b2(1 − y)2 − a2(x − 1)2 +2 ( ax + by)a(x − 1 − lnx)





  Ef(x;y;z)dz: (B.10)
Using the implicit function theorem we can  nd x and y as functions of Sc and Sf
from (B.7) and (B.8). Hence, the value function at time t is
V(t;Sc;Sf)= (t;x(Sc;Sf);y(Sc;Sf)):
A necessary condition for the proposed exploitation patterns to be a strongly time-





















where     =e rt . First we claim
G(x;y)=xGx(x;y)+yGy(x;y) − xFx(x;y) − yFy(x;y): (B.12)


























Moreover,   Ef is homogeneous of degree zero which is immediate from the de nition







[x   Ef
x(x;y;z)+y   Ef
y(x;y;z)+z   Ef
z(x;y;z)]dz =0 :
It is easily seen that these equations yield (B.12).
The next step is to solve G from (B.9), to calculate Gx and Gy and to insert all
three of them into (B.12). This yields
xFx + yFy = 1
2(a(x − 1) + b(y − 1))
+2r(     − x    x − y    y)=(a(x − 1) + b(y + 1)): (B.13)








@Sf = ary(x − 1)=(b(y − 1)xFx − a(x − 1)yFy):F. Groot et al./Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28 (2003) 287–306 305
Hence, we  nd a second equation in xFx and yFy by inserting these results in (B.11).




a(x − 1) +
2ra(x − 1)     − (a(x − 1) + b(y − 1))2rx    x





b(y − 1) +
2rb(y − 1)     − (a(x − 1) + b(y − 1))2ry    y
(a(x − 1) + b(y + 1))(a(x − 1) + b(y − 1))
: (B.15)
When (B.14) is di erentiated with respect to y and (B.15) with respect to x,w e
 nd the following partial di erential equation for  , because Fxy = Fyx:
2ab(x−y)(a(x−1)+by) +b(a(x − 1) + b(y − 1))(b(y − 1) − a(x − 1))x x
+a(a(x − 1) + b(y − 1))(b(y +1 )+a(x − 1) − 2bx)y y =0 : (B.16)
When solving the partial di erential equation it has to be taken into account that if




b2 (1 − y)2; 0¡y61:





[a(x − 1) + b(y − 1)]
×
 
[a(x − 1) + b(y + 1)]
2 − 4b2xa=by; (B.17)
where it is to be understood that x and y are functions of Sc and Sf.
The last step is to  nd the functions   Ef and   Ec. Since we know the function   we
can solve F from (B.14) and (B.15). Then G follows from (B.9). From the de nitions
of F and G this yields Ef(t) and subsequently Ec(t) through (B.1):
Ec(t)=
(  p − kf)(kf − kc)+( e rt f)2 − (  p − kf) cert
 
ert(2 f −  c)
  p + kc − 2kf




   
 
 
(kf − kc +e rt f)2 − (  p − kc)ert c
 
ert(2 f −  c)
  p + kc − 2kf





We can now verify Eqs. (22)–(24). It is easy to check that Eqs. (22) and (24) are
satis ed. Eq. (23) reduces to SQR¡2(   p − kf − ert f), where SQR is the square root
in the value function V given in (B.17). It can be shown that this is precisely satis ed
for kf ¡ 1
2(  p + kc).306 F. Groot et al./Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28 (2003) 287–306
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